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Abstract 
Under the EU framework for dealing with banking problems, 
resolution is seen as an exception to be granted only if 
liquidation under national insolvency proceedings is not 
warranted. We look at the recent liquidation of two Italian banks 
to show how resolution and liquidation differ substantially when 
it comes to the scope of legislation applicable to the use of 
public funds. We argue that more clarity would be needed as to 
the role that the concepts of critical functions and public interest 
play in Member States’ decision to grant liquidation aid, and that 
the two-tier system – in which resolution is done at the EU level 
but insolvency remains a national prerogative – raises issues in 
the context of Banking Union.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Under the current EU frameworks for dealing with banking problems, resolution is seen as an exception 
to be granted only if liquidation under national insolvency proceedings would not be warranted. This 
is most notably the case when the bank provides critical functions to the economy, or when its 
liquidation may have sizeable effects on financial stability. 
 
The two options – resolution and liquidation – differ substantially when it comes to the scope of 
legislation that is applicable to the use of public funds. Resolution is covered by the EU Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive, liquidation is regulated by national insolvency laws; the use of public funds 
in resolution would be subject to both BRRD scope and State Aid scope, whereas the use of public 
funds in liquidation is only subject to the State aid scope.  
 
The liquidation of Veneto Banca S.p.a. and Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.a. highlights how this two-tier 
framework raises some important questions in the context of Banking Union. The first question is 
whether the definition of critical functions and of “public interest” – key elements in the context of 
liquidation – should be clarified. A second question is whether the current legal and regulatory 
situation within the Banking Union ensures that similar banks can expect a predictable equal treatment 
in case of failure, or whether there may be a need for legal or regulatory clarification or harmonization. 
 
We argue that more clarity would be warranted as to the role that the concepts of critical functions and 
public interest play in Member States’ decision to grant liquidation aid, as the current situation may 
give lead to outcomes in which the view of national authorities seems to contradict the SRB’s 
assessment. While the purpose of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive overview of different 
national insolvency regimes across the EU, we argue that the current diversity is a source of uncertainty 
about the outcome of a liquidation procedure, for all actors involved. For Banking Union to function 
effectively, the framework should be changed so as to provide the same level of certainty in liquidation 
as there is expected to be in resolution. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
On 27 January 2017, SRB Chair Elke König highlighted in a speech1 that „[m]ost banks are now in such a 
shape that […] their failure would not endanger financial stability and that they can be resolved if they fail 
- like any other business in the market economy – through regular insolvency procedures. [...] The extra safety 
net of resolution is only for the few “. Under the current EU frameworks for dealing with banking 
problems, in fact, resolution is seen as an exception to be granted only if liquidation under national 
insolvency proceedings would not be warranted. This is the case when the bank provides critical 
functions to the economy, or when its liquidation may have potentially sizeable effects on financial 
stability. In such instances, the existence of a public interest should be established by the Single 
Resolution Board (SRB), and the bank should be put into resolution.   
The two options – resolution and liquidation – differ substantially when it comes to the scope of 
legislation that is applicable to the use of public funds. While resolution is governed by the EU Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), liquidation is regulated by national insolvency laws.  And 
while the use of public funds in resolution is subject to both State Aid scope and BRRD scope – thus 
requiring a preliminary bail-in up to at least 8% of total liabilities – the use of public funds in liquidation 
is only subject to the State aid requirement of a “light” burden sharing of equity and junior debt. 
Depending on the structure of individual banks’ balance sheets – i.e. on how much junior debt they 
have on their liability side – the BRRD bail-in requirement could potentially reach up to senior 
bondholders, whereas the light State Aid burden allows shedding them from losses.  
We look at the liquidation of Veneto Banca S.p.a. and Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.a. and highlight 
how this two-tier framework raises some important questions in the context of Banking Union, whose 
ultimate aim is to ensure clarity about the rules governing banking crisis and their outcome for banks, 
private creditors, and taxpayers.  
The first question is whether the definition of critical functions and of public interest – two key elements 
in the context of liquidation – should be clarified. While we think these concepts are clear for the 
purpose of the SRB’s assessment that should be based on them, more clarity would be warranted as to 
the role that they can play in the Member States’ decision to grant liquidation aid. We argue that the 
current framework may lead to situations where the view of national authorities seems to be in 
contradiction with that of the SRB, such as in the Italian case.  
A second question is whether the current legal and regulatory environment within Banking Union 
ensures that similar banks can expect a predictable equal treatment in case of failure, or whether there 
may be a need for legal or regulatory clarification or harmonization. While the purpose of this paper is 
not to provide a comprehensive overview of different national insolvency regimes across the EU – a 
work that has been done by others2 - we argue that the current diversity in national insolvency 
frameworks is a source of uncertainty about the outcome of liquidation procedure, for all actors 
involved. The fact that insolvency law remains national makes it possible for Member States to amend 
it compared to the normal insolvency proceedings that constitutes the reference for the SRB’s 
assessment of the no-creditor-worse-off condition. In particular, to the extent that different 
governments may have a different propensity to provide liquidation aid to the banking sector, the final 
outcome is not clear. Absent an EU insolvency law – or at least further harmonisation – this can lead to 
paradoxical results such as in the Italian case, where senior creditors were eventually better off under 
insolvency than they would have been under resolution, while taxpayers were worse off. For Banking 
                                                             
1 Speech delivered at the Belgian Financial Forum, January 2017 
2 e.g. McCormack, G., Keay, A., Brown, S. and J. Dhlgreen (2014) 
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Union to function effectively, the framework should be clarified so as to provide the same level of 
certainty in liquidation as there is expected to be in resolution. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent liquidation of two Italian banks, 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca. Section 3 reviews the different legal framework 
governing the recourse to public funds in resolution and liquidation. Section 4 highlights two main 
issues that the Italian case raises in the context of Banking Union.  
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 THE VENETO AND VICENZA CASE 
On 23 June 2017, two Italian lenders – Veneto Banca S.p.a. and Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.a. – were 
declared to be “failing or likely to fail” by the European Central Bank (ECB) in its capacity as supervisor 
for euro area significant institutions3. The two banks had already been among the Italian institutions 
that failed the ECB’s comprehensive assessment in 2014. In 2016, they benefitted from a EUR 3.5 billion 
investment by the Italian bank-funded Atlante fund, but their financial position deteriorated further in 
20174, ultimately resulting in a combined capital need of EUR 1.2 billion. In March 2017, the two banks 
requested a precautionary recapitalisation, which however would have required the capital shortfall to 
be covered by private means, as a pre-condition5. The banks’ business plans were eventually not 
deemed credible enough by the ECB, whose negative assessment opened to the possibility of either 
resolution or liquidation, with the decision to be taken by the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The SRB 
decided that public interest for resolution was not present, because neither of the banks provided 
critical functions, and their failure was unlikely to have significant adverse impact on financial stability.   
 
Table 1: Assets and Liabilities acquired by Intesa (ISP) 
Assets bn Liabilities bn 
Credits vis-à-vis banks 3.8 Debts vis-à-vis banks 9.3 
Credits vis-à-vis customers 30.1 Debts vis-à-vis customers 25.8 
Financial Assets  8.8 Bonds (ISP only takes senior) 11.8 
Shareholdings  0.02 Financial liabilities 2.6 
Others 3.01 Others 1.8 
Total  
(incl. imbalance and 
financing to LCA) 
51.3 Total 51.3 
Source: Bank of Italy (2017) 
 
As a result, Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza were wound down under Italian insolvency 
law on 25 June 2017. Italian law provides for several insolvency procedures: banks and other financial 
institutions – as well as other selected types of enterprises – are subject to a regime called “forced 
administrative liquidation”, in Italian: Liquidazione Coatta Amministrativa (LCA)6 (see Box 1 in section 4.2 
for details). In the context of liquidation, shares (mostly owned by Atlante) and subordinated debt were 
wiped out to meet the minimum burden-sharing requirement established in the European 
Commission’s 2013 Communication on State Aid to banks. The performing part of the banks’ assets 
was acquired by Intesa San Paolo – Italy’s second largest bank – together with some of the liabilities, 
most notably deposits and senior debt (see Table 1 for details on the transferred items). Intesa paid a 
symbolic sum of EUR 1 for the acquisition, and benefitted from a EUR 4.8 billion cash injection by the 
State. Of these, EUR 3.5 billion were intended to ensure that the acquisition would not undermine 
Intesa’s equity ratios, whereas EUR 1.3 billion were destined to cover the costs of closing branches and 
                                                             
3 ECB press release: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/ssm.pr170623.en.html  
4 Merler (2017a) 
5 Merler (2017b) 
6 Backer and McKenzi 2017 
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managing dismissal/redeployment of staff in the banks being liquidated. Intesa was also granted State 
guarantees that could potentially total up to EUR 12 billion7. Of this, up to EUR 6.35 billion might cover 
the repayment of debt held deemed to be not good after due diligence; up to EUR 4 billion might 
constitute a buffer for currently performing debts that are at high risk; and the remaining guarantee of 
up to EUR 2 billion might cover potential legal risks of the banks being liquidated. The non-performing 
part of the two banks’ balance sheet was transferred to SGA (Società per la Gestione di Attività) – a vehicle 
set up for the rescue of Banco di Napoli at the end of the 1990s – with aim of maximising the recovery 
over time.  
The case of Veneto Banca and Popolare di Vicenza is reminiscent of that of Banca Romagna Cooperativa 
(BRC), a significantly smaller8 Italian lender liquidated in July 20159. BRC’s assets and liabilities were 
transferred to Banca Sviluppo, part of the Italian ICCREA Group. In the process, BRC equity and junior 
debt were left behind in the liquidation estate – similarly to what happened in the Veneto and Vicenza 
case. The BRC operation was conducted under national insolvency law by selling only parts of assets 
and liabilities out of liquidation. The Italian mandatory deposit guarantee scheme for the sector 
(FDGDCC) covered the negative difference between the transferred assets and liabilities – an action 
that qualified as State aid, because it was beyond the DGS’ pay-out function, but was authorised by the 
European Commission. The scale of the BRC case was obviously much smaller than the Veneto and 
Vicenza case, and the cost of the operation for the FGDCC was estimated at the time as EUR 260.8 
million maximum10.  
Because of the structure of the operation, the case of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza has 
also been compared to the case of the Spanish Banco Popular, which was acquired for a symbolic 
amount of EUR 1 by Banco Santander. Contrary to the two Italian banks, however, Banco Popular was 
put in resolution by the SRB due to the existence of public interest. The similarity between the Italian 
and the Spanish case stems from the fact that the sale and transfer of part of the failing banks’ balance 
sheet to a buyer is also foreseen as a resolution tool under Article 38 BRRD. Mesnard et al. (2017) 
highlights also that the measures implemented in the Italian case are very similar to those in previous 
resolution cases implemented in the EU, such as for instance the resolution of the Greek Panellinia Bank 
through a transfer order to Piraeus Bank in April 201511. Despite superficial similarity, however, there is 
a significant difference between the Italian and Spanish operations when it comes to the scope of EU 
legislation applicable in terms of public funds use, which is reviewed in more detail in Section 3. 
  
                                                             
7 Italian Law-decree No 99 of 25 June 2017 
8 As of 31 May 2015, the unpublished accounts of BRC show a balance sheet size of EUR 891 mln and a loss of 
EUR 111.3 mln (see EC 2015) 
9 Merler (2016) 
10 EC (2015) 
11 In that case, the performing part of the balance sheet was transferred to another Greek Bank, and the 
difference between assets and liabilities was financed by the Greek resolution fund 
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 USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS: LIQUIDATION VS. RESOLUTION 
Under the current EU rules, there are two options to deal with banks that are failing or likely to fail: 
liquidation or resolution. The two options differ quite significantly when it comes to the scope of EU 
legislation that is applicable to the use of public funds (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Use of public funds in the EU framework 
 
Source:  European Commission (2017) 
Article 32(4) of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) suggests that, as a rule, the fact that 
a banks needs public support is sufficient for the ECB to declare the bank is failing or likely to fail. Banks 
that happen to have capital shortfalls should therefore ideally cover that from private sources. If that is 
not feasible, a Member State can still intervene in line with market conditions, i.e. on terms that would 
be the same for a private investor. This kind of intervention would remain outside the scope of both 
the resolution framework and EU state aid policy12.  Alternatively, if the bank is solvent it could qualify 
for precautionary recapitalisation, which allows the use of public funds in compliance with state-aid 
rules and outside the scope of the BRRD resolution framework. Article 32(4.d) BRRD states that this 
extraordinary public financial support does not trigger resolution if it is required “in order to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a member state and preserve financial stability”, and if it is “at 
prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution.” If the conditions for 
precautionary recapitalisation are met, public funds can thus be used without triggering resolution and 
the associated 8% bail-in requirement. The burden sharing requirement of equity and junior debt 
would still apply, as per the Commission’s 2013 State Aid Communication13. 
                                                             
12 An example is the recapitalisation of Portuguese Caixa Geral de Depósitos in March 2017. See EC (2017). 
13 This option was used in Italy with Monte Dei Paschi (MPS), in June 2017. See Merler (2017). 
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If a bank is declared by the ECB to be failing or likely to fail14, the precautionary recapitalisation option 
is not available, and the choice is between liquidation or resolution. This decision is a prerogative of 
the Single Resolution Board (SRB), and it hinges on an assessment of the existence of public interest. 
Due to its potential effects on property rights, the choice to put a bank in resolution should be seen as 
an exception (EC 2017), limited to cases where winding up the institution under normal insolvency 
proceedings would not meet the resolution objectives to the same extent15. Resolution aims at 
ensuring continuity of critical functions, avoiding a significant adverse effect on the financial system, 
protecting public funds, covered depositors and covered investors, and clients’ assets and funds16.  If 
the bank is put into resolution, the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR) requires that the 
bank's losses be covered by the bail-in of shareholders and creditors up to 8% of the bank's liabilities, 
before the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) can be accessed. Depending on the composition of individual 
banks’ balance sheets, this may imply the bail-in of senior debt and potentially even uncovered 
deposits. The use of funds from the SRF is anyway subject to the Commission’s State aid assessment.  
If, on the other hand, the SRB were to decide that resolution is not in the public interest, then the bank 
would be wound down under national insolvency law, applied by national authorities. State aid is 
possible in the context of liquidation – in the form of liquidation aid – and it is subject to the State aid 
discipline, including the burden-sharing requirements laid out in the 2013 Communication. The 
rationale underlying aid in liquidation is that while the winding up of small banks is not expected to 
have systemic effects, it may still have important local effects. Currently, it is for Member States to 
decide whether liquidation may harm the local economy, and whether the use national funds is 
warranted to mitigate the damage – although any liquidation aid would then need to be cleared by 
the European Commission. 
A comparison of the Popular case with the Veneto and Vicenza one highlights the practical implications 
of this different legal scope. The use of public funds in the context of resolution with sale of assets to a 
private investor would have required the preliminary bail-in of at least 8% of the banks’ equity and 
liabilities. Depending on the structure of the bank’s balance sheet, this preliminary requirement could 
have entailed a bail-in of senior liabilities. The use of public funds in the context of a similar operation 
conducted in liquidation is instead regulated under the State aid framework, which requires a 
preliminary contribution of equity and junior debt only. In both the case of Popular and the case of the 
two Italian banks, senior debt was not touched. But Banco Popular was resolved under BRRD, and the 
sale of business was accompanied by a EUR 7 billion capital raise from the acquiring bank (Santander) 
and a EUR 3.3 billion bail-in of equity and debt. In the case of two Italian banks, which were dealt with 
under national insolvency law, equity and junior debt were wiped out but the acquiring bank (Intesa) 
benefitted from publicly financed liquidation aid.  
  
                                                             
14 Art. 32(4) BRRD 
15 Art. 32 BRRD 
16 Art. 31(2) BRRD 
Critical functions and public interest in banking services: Need for clarification? 
 
PE 614.479 11  
 QUESTION RAISED 
Since the scope of EU law regulating the use of public money in resolution and liquidation is different, 
a substantially similar operation conducted under these two different frameworks can lead to very 
different outcomes for (i) the acquiring bank; (ii) the banks’ creditors and (iii) the taxpayers. The 
distinction between resolution and liquidation is ultimately drawn by the existence of public interest, 
an assessment that is the task of the SRB. In this section we will look at the SRB’s assessment in the case 
of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza, as well as to the implications that national insolvency 
frameworks may have on the clarity of EU rules in the context of Banking Union.  
4.1 Critical functions and public interest 
A closer look at the case of Veneto Banca and Popolare di Vicenza reveals the existence of a friction 
between the existence of public interest as viewed by the SRB, and as viewed by the Italian 
government.  
A key element in the assessment of the existence of public interest is the criticality of specific functions 
performed by the banks that are failing or likely to fail. The Commission Delegated Regulation 2016/778 
defines a function as critical when: (i) it is provided by an institution to third parties not affiliated to the 
institution or group; and (ii) a sudden disruption of that function would likely have a material negative 
impact on the third parties, give rise to contagion or undermine the general confidence of market 
participants due to the systemic relevance of the function for the third parties and the systemic 
relevance of the institution or group in providing the function.  
The SRB decision, published on June 23rd, states that public interest does not exist in the case of Veneto 
Banca and Popolare di Vicenza, because neither of the two banks provides critical functions, and their 
failure is not expected to have significant adverse impact on financial stability. With respect to the 
functions identified by the institutions as critical – i.e. deposit-taking, lending activities and payment 
services – the SRB concludes that these are provided to a limited number of third parties and can be 
replaced in an acceptable manner and within a reasonable timeframe.  
The assessment of the financial stability implications largely looks at the two banks’ degree of systemic 
relevance and interconnectedness. A previous SRB assessment – based on information available at the 
end of 2015 – had deemed liquidation under normal insolvency procedure not credible, mostly due to 
the potential adverse impact on market confidence and the risk of contagion to other credit 
institutions17. For both banks, the SRB’s assessment changed in light of “significant development” 
occurred in 2016, which reduced the banks’ systemic relevance18.  In particular, the SRB highlights that 
despite significant deposit outflows since the beginning of 2016, deposit volumes in Italy remained 
relatively stable during the same period, suggesting that the two banks’ deposit outflows were 
absorbed by other institutions in Italy. This is taken by the SRB also as evidence supporting the view 
that the deposit-taking function of the two banks was not critical, as it could be replaced within a 
reasonable time-frame by some of the active credit institutions in the regions concerned, limiting 
potential impact on the real economy and the financial markets.  
In looking at the effect of liquidation on financial stability, the SRB focuses on Italy as a whole, but it 
also stresses that: 
“despite higher market shares at the regional level, it has to be noted that the market share 
of the Banks, even in the core region of Veneto, has deteriorated without having a 
                                                             
17 SRB (2017a), recital (19) page 5; SRB (2017c), recital (19) page 5. 
18 SRB(2017a), recital (50), page 8 
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measurable impact as evidenced by key economic indicators. Furthermore, substitutability 
of the deposit and lending functions in the Veneto region is expected to be high due to the 
large number of credit institutions active in the region.” [author’s emphasis] 
In its assessment, the SRB thus not only excludes a systemic impact of liquidation at the national level, 
but it also seems to dismiss the possibility of a significant impact at the local level. The Italian 
Government’s Decree, published on June 25th and converted into law in July 2017, takes an opposite 
view. The introductory recitals in the Italian Decree19 in fact state that: 
“Absent measures of public support, the placement of [the two banks] into a forced 
administrative liquidation would lead to the destruction of value of the banks, with 
consequent serious losses for non-professional creditors that are not protected nor preferred, 
and it would entail a sudden interruption in the provision of credit to businesses and families 
with negative repercussions of economic and social character, as well as on employment”.  
 
As a result, “there is the extraordinary need and urgency to adopt measures aimed at 
allowing the orderly exit of the banks from the market and avoiding a serious disturbance to 
the local economy”  
 
The view of the Italian government is reiterated in MEF (2017) where, in discussing the State Aid 
measures implemented, the €3.5 billion support to Banca Intesa is described as “fundamental because 
it is precisely this intervention that guarantees the continuity of provision of credit to the present customers 
of the two banks (families, businesses, artisans)”. But this seems to contradict the SRB’s conclusion about 
the substitutability – even at the local level – of the banks’ functions. Ultimately, the justification for the 
state aid provided in the Italian case hinges on the government’s own assessment of local effects of 
liquidation. The wording of the Decree, however, seems to be in contradiction with the SRB’s own view 
about the banks critical functions: while the SRB identified no public interest to justify resolution, the 
national government identified enough public interest to justify sizable state aid. 
A first question raised by the case of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza is thus whether the 
definition of critical functions and the applicable assessment criteria are sufficiently clear at the Union 
level. Here a distinction is worth making. While the definition of critical functions seems to be clear as 
it concerns the SRB’s assessment of the existence of public interest, it is not equally clear what role it 
plays in the EU discipline on liquidation aid, which is mostly contained in the EC 2013 Communication. 
The rationale for allowing Member States to provide liquidation aid is laid out in EC (2017) according 
to which: “outside the European banking resolution framework, it is for Member States to decide whether 
they consider a bank exit to have a serious impact on the regional economy, e.g. on the financing of small 
and medium enterprises in the regional economy, and whether they wish to use national funds to mitigate 
these effects”. The 2013 Communication, however, does not include guidelines or on how this decision 
should be taken. In the absence of clarity on what constitutes a reasonable “serious impact on the 
regional economy” the rules on liquidation aid leave room for potentially controversial results, such as 
in the Italian case. This in turn raises the question of whether the SRB itself should be tasked to provide 
an explicit assessment of the impact of liquidation at the local level. Such option would have obvious 
benefit in terms of clarity of the assessment underlying the decision to grant liquidation aid, but it 
would be best complemented by a harmonisation of insolvency frameworks that currently differ 
significantly at the national level (see next Section). 
                                                             
19 Italian Parliament (2017) 
Critical functions and public interest in banking services: Need for clarification? 
 
PE 614.479 13  
4.2 What is normal insolvency proceedings? 
In the BRRD and the SRMR, normal insolvency proceedings20 constitute the benchmark scenario against 
which the (exceptional) alternative of resolution is assessed. Article 74 of BRRD and Article 15(1) of the 
SRMR states that “no creditor shall incur greater loss than would have been incurred if the entity had been 
wound up (...) under normal insolvency proceedings” (no creditor worse off principle) and Article 20(16) 
and 20(17) provide for a valuation to be conducted to assess whether the treatment of shareholders 
and creditors under normal insolvency proceedings would differ from that under resolution. 
Importantly, Article 20(18) of the SRMR states that the valuation of the insolvency proceedings scenario 
should disregard any extraordinary public financial support.   
Differently from resolution, however, insolvency remains regulated at national level by national 
insolvency laws. This creates two potentially problematic issues. First, insolvency regimes differ across 
countries (see McCormack et al 2014 for a detailed legal perspective). As mentioned in section 3, Italian 
law provides for several insolvency procedures, where banks and other financial institutions – as well 
as other selected types of enterprises –  are subject to a regime called “forced administrative 
liquidation” (Liquidazione Coatta Amministrativa LCA). Under the LCA framework, the liquidators are 
nominated by the Bank of Italy, which enjoys a high degree of oversight on the process. Unlike other 
procedures – and unlike what happens in other countries, e.g. Spain – there is no delegated judge, and 
the LCA is mainly administrative in nature21 (see Box 1 for details). This probably reflects the intention 
to ensure a swift liquidation process for entities that are perceived as critical, subtracting them from 
the traditionally long Italian judicial procedure. The Italian Parliament voted on 11th October 2017 on a 
new law that will change the framework of insolvency and bankruptcy in Italy, streamlining it. Among 
other changes, the new law reduces the case covered by LCA, but it does not change its applicability 
to banks and financial institutions22.  
 
BOX 1 – Liquidation in Italy and in Spain 
In Italy, liquidazione coatta amministrativa (LCA) is the ordinary liquidation proceeding for banks and 
financial institutions, governed by Legislative Decree no. 385/1993 (the "Italian Banking Act") and by 
specific provisions of the Italian Transposing Law and of the Italian statute governing insolvencies, 
Royal Decree no. 267/1942. CAL is initiated by issuance of a Decree of the Italian Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, and the first step is the appointment by the Bank of Italy of one or more receivers and 
of a Supervisory Committee which monitors liquidation process. The receivers replace the former 
management, ascertain the institution's liabilities, carry out the liquidation of assets, initiate any legal 
action in respect of possible liabilities of former management and auditors and periodically report 
to the Bank of Italy. Following the issuance of the Decree and the appointment of the receivers, no 
acts of enforcement may be initiated or continued by creditors and all payments due by the financial 
institution are suspended. Within 30 days from the receivers' appointment, all creditors are formally 
notified of their claims; the statement of liabilities, consisting of a list of the creditors admitted to the 
                                                             
20 Article 2(47) of BRRD states that: “‘normal insolvency proceedings’ means collective insolvency proceedings which 
entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator or an administrator normally 
applicable to institutions under national law and either specific to those institutions or generally applicable to any 
natural or legal person” 
21 Backer and McKenzie 2017.  
22 DDL n. 2681 
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CAL proceedings, is then filed by the receivers with Bank of Italy. The statement also identifies the 
creditors' ranking and the size of their claims. Transfers may be performed at any stage of CAL, 
including prior to the filing of the definitive statement of liabilities. The receivers may carry out the 
liquidation by either selling individual assets or through sale of aggregates of assets and liabilities.  
In Spain, insolvency law establishes one single insolvency procedure (concurso), applied to any 
insolvent debtor, which includes a common phase during which the insolvency administrator is 
appointed, an inventory of the assets and creditors is performed, and claims are ranked. The 
insolvency process is managed under the supervision of the Spanish Mercantile Courts, which are 
competent to hear and decide on insolvency proceedings of a credit institution. Differently from the 
Bank of Italy – which appoints the liquidators – the FROB’s role in normal insolvency procedure is 
limited to presenting the Court with a proposed list of insolvency administrators from which the 
Court must select the appointee. The treatment and safeguards provided to the various classes of 
creditors, as well as the ranking of their claims in insolvency proceedings of Spanish credit 
institutions are the same established by the law for creditors or claims relating to any non-banking 
business subject to insolvency proceedings. The Spanish transposition of BRRD, however, provides 
exceptions in the event of an insolvency proceeding of a Spanish credit institution.  
Source: SRB (2017a; 2017b) 
 
A second issue related to the national character of insolvency framework is the potential for them to 
be altered under national law. In its assessments published on 23rd June 201723, the SRB states that in 
order to assess the need to take resolution action based on the resolution objectives of protecting 
depositors and investors and protecting client assets and client funds, a comparison was made 
between the hypothetical resolution action and LCA proceedings. The SRB specifically states that: 
since “normal insolvency proceedings (i.e. LCA) allow for the transfer to a purchaser of the 
same portfolio which could have been transferred in case of resolution action, it can be 
concluded that LCA proceedings could meet these two resolution objectives to the same 
extent24”.  
 
The SRB also observes that25: 
“Normal Italian insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives to the same 
extent as resolution, since such proceedings would also ensure a comparable degree of 
protection for depositors, investors, other customers, clients’ funds and assets.” 
 
So, in the context of the SRB’s assessment, “winding-up of the institution under normal insolvency 
proceedings” refers for the SRB to the LCA proceedings26, and when discussing the Italian LCA and its 
                                                             
23 SRB (2017a) and SRB (2017c) 
24 SRB (2017a; 2017c), recital (51), page 9 
25 SRB (2017d); see also SRB(2017a; 2017c) 
26 SRB (2017a; 2017c) Article 4(1) 
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degree of creditor protections, the SRB makes no mention of additional public funds27. However, the 
opening recitals of the act converting into law the Italian Decree of 25th June 2017 states that: 
 
“[…] the banks must be put into LCA as provided […] the [Italian] Banking Law [Testo Unico 
Bancario]. However, the ordinary liquidation procedure in atomistic form would imply very 
serious damages to the economy: it is therefore appropriate to envisage a solution that 
allows managing the crisis of the two groups with additional instruments with respect to 
those foreseen in the Banking Law” [author’s emphasis] 
This wording suggests that the regime actually implemented constitutes a modified version of the 
ordinary liquidation proceedings, by the addition of liquidation aid. The effect of this modification has 
been that senior creditors were actually better off in insolvency than they would have been in a 
resolution. The peculiarity of this outcome was noticed – among others – by the Chairman of the 
European Banking Authority Andrea Enria who, in an interview with the Italian paper “La Stampa”, 
stressed the fact that creditors in liquidation should not be better off than in resolution28. The fact that 
insolvency law remains a national prerogative thus creates uncertainty about the extent of possible 
amendments by national governments and the ensuing consequences for both the banks, their private 
creditors and taxpayers. To ensure that banks failing in different countries are liquidated under the 
same conditions and know what to expect, it would be warranted to harmonise national insolvency 
laws, preferably introducing an EU insolvency framework.  
 
  
                                                             
27 SRB (2017a; 2017c), Section 2.2.1 (“Description of the Italian insolvency proceedings”) 
28 La Stampa: “Enria (Eba): “We warned Italy in 2014 about risks for banks’’, available at 
http://www.lastampa.it/2017/07/19/esteri/lastampa-in-english/enria-eba-we-warned-italy-in-about-risks-for-
banks-ZqtCBNa7Yp1dPEtxY5CHWI/pagina.html  
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 CONCLUSIONS 
Under the current EU frameworks for dealing with banks that are failing or likely to fail, resolution is 
seen as an exception to be granted only in case the liquidation under national insolvency 
proceedings would not be feasible or warranted. This is part of a more general shift towards lesser 
involvement of public funds in managing banking crisis. But resolution and liquidation differ 
substantially when it comes to the scope of legislation that is applicable to the use of public funds. 
While resolution is governed by the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), liquidation is 
regulated by national insolvency laws. While the use of public funds in resolution would be subject to 
both BRRD scope and State Aid scope – thus requiring a preliminary bail-in up to at least 8% of total 
liabilities, the use of public funds in liquidation is only subject to State aid burden sharing 
requirements.  
Ultimately, the distinction between the two cases relies in the SRB’s assessment of the existence of 
public interest, which in turn hinges on a determination of whether the functions performed by the 
failing institution is critical. In this paper, we have looked at the practical application of the SRMR’s 
requirements in the liquidation of the two Italian Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, 
highlighting the existence of two problematic issues.  
First, while the definition of critical functions seems clear as regards the SRB’s assessment of the 
existence of public interest, it is not equally clear what role it plays in the EU discipline on liquidation 
aid, as the 2013 Banking Communication does not include guidelines or on how the local effect of 
liquidation should be evaluated. In the absence of clarity on what constitutes a serious impact on the 
regional economy, the rules on liquidation aid leave room for governments to effectively re-instate at 
the local level the public interest that the SRB has denied at national (or, in the Italian case, even at the 
regional) level. One way to overcome this problem could be to task the SRB to provide an explicit 
assessment of the impact of liquidation at the local level, to ensure the assessment is homogeneous.  
Second, and related, the Veneto and Vicenza case highlights the problematic nature of a two-tier 
framework where resolution is dealt with under EU law and liquidation is left under diverse national 
insolvency procedures. The problem with this is twofold. On one hand, the difference in insolvency 
frameworks implies that failing banks would face different insolvency proceedings in different 
countries. This is exemplified by a comparison of the Spanish insolvency – which is a court-based 
process – and the Italian special regimes for banks – which is essentially administrative. The fact that 
insolvency is regulated under national law also makes it easier for governments to amend the ordinary 
insolvency framework, such as in the case of Veneto and Vicenza. This could give rise to peculiar 
situations whereby senior creditors fare better in insolvency than they would in resolution. In order to 
avoid this uncertainty, the best option would be to further harmonise insolvency laws possibly 
introducing an EU-wide one.  
For Banking Union to function properly, banks, creditors, and taxpayers deserve to have certainty about 
the rules governing liquidation as well as the outcome. This objective would be best served by a single 
EU insolvency regime to complement the current EU framework for resolution, and by a clarification of 
Member State’s discretion in establishing local public interest when it comes to liquidation aid.  
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